Нет, товарищ майор твой ip увидит просто став на раздачу.

Да.

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платный vps, взломанный дедик, взломанный вайфай соседа </thread>

>>175452732 (OP)
Почему именно анонимно, в чём проблема качать без vpn?

>>175452732 (OP)
Качай что угодно, только не храни у себя на жестких дисках. Мало ли какие хацкеры взломали твой вайфай и всякое качают? Недоказуемо. Сам факт незаконного скачивания — это только повод к проверке компьютера. Если на нем ничего нет, то и суда нет, как говорится.

>>175454661
Нахера, просро два компв, один нотбук и комп, качай на нотбук да и всё, резко взял и ушёл с ним.

>>175454658
Все видят твой ip.

>>175454661
>это только повод
А после проверки окажется, что у тебя там обнаружили пять тонн ЦП, схему атомной бомбы, переписку с алькаидой и маршрут кортежа Путина с обозначением мест для снайпера.

Лучше не давать никаких поводов.

>>175455504
В россии тоже за скачевание ебут, я даже не занл. В Европе туго с этим да, но в России и не знал.

>>175452732 (OP)
Используй бесплатный впн.

>>175455869
Например?

>>175455941
browsec

>>175452732 (OP)
Какой же ты конченный, в хроме есть плагин для рутрекера, блядь.

>>175456069
>browsec
Это же только для браузера. Или я не то смотрел?

>>175456241
И что он делает? Обходит блокировку запросов к трекеру? И как это помогает анонимности, когда любой майор может подключиться к раздаче и увидеть твой реальный ип?

>>175456481
В россии никто не запрещает тебе пользоваться торрентом, пизды дают только тем, кто владеет этим трекером
Ну и если ничего запрещенного не будешь раздавать в этом самом торренте

>>175456583
Качаешь = раздаёшь.
Недавно хентай к цп приравняли. Что завтра им в голову ударит?

Посоветуйте vpn для андроида. После закрытия оперы вообще ничего толкового найти не могу.

>>175452732 (OP)
Единственный годный варинт, это купить vps/vds хостинг и там запустить свой сервер с впн. Тем более оно даже дешевле платных впнов. Плюс не заблочит никто

>>175456346
>Удаленное подключение не удалось установить из-за сбоя использованных VPN-туннелей. Возможно, VPN-сервер недоступен. Если это подключение пытается использовать L2TP- или IPsec-туннель, параметры безопасности, необходимые для согласования IPsec, могут быть настроены неверно.

>>175456751
Тачвпн: торренты качать не позволяет трафик безлимитный.
анблокервпн: торренты качать позволяет трафик безлимитный, торренты качаются не со всех адресов.
инфвпн: строит туннели в ipv6, к торрентам относится настороженно, трафик безлимитный.
Пока хватит.

>>175456069
простое бесплатное расширение для браузера, также есть в play market для android

>>175457107
Попробуй тот же только se, me часто оваливается, плюс можешь попробовать опенвпн с того же адреса. У меня сейчас и ме и се нормально подключаются.

>>175457293
Спасибо

>>175452732 (OP)
А кого взьебнули за скачивания, не дашь ссылку?

>>175452732 (OP)
очевидный I2P

>>175462817
http://sarov.bezformata.ru/listnews/porno-v-torrentah-zaveli-ugolovnoe/8935367/

>>175456241
Причем тут блять плагин для хроме и закачку через торент? ты совсем ебобо?

Rats on the boat -> Свободный софт.

А в чём, собсна, проблемы качать торренты без впна? Товарищ майор придёт и пиратский софт отнимет?

>>175456346
> через тор
ТЫ ПИДОР
>>175464156
В бутылке.

>>175454661
Были истории, когда после факта скачивания товарищи Майоры стучались в дверь, даже без хранения.

>>175465937
Пруфы?

>>175466521
Удваиваю.

>>175463859
Не понимаю. Обьясните.

Я пытался прописывать настройки прокси в юторенте, но эта мразь их игнорирует и качает блять напрямую.

>>175467161
> прокси
Что за прокси, товарищ, расскажите. А VPN?

>>175465426
> > через тор
> ТЫ ПИДОР
А что не так?

>>175467637
Bittorrent over Tor isn't a good idea | Tor Blog
Bittorrent over Tor isn't a good idea. ... The same two fixes as before: don't run Bittorrent over Tor, and/or get your Bittorrent developers to fix their applications.
> Plaintext over Tor is still plaintext | Tor Blog

Tor provides anonymity and privacy by hiding where your Internet traffic is going and where it came from, but users must protect the security of their traffic by using encryption. Once you exit the last relay, you are back on the open Internet. Some web email providers, banks, and other sites use encryption by default when you log in, something you can check by looking for "https://" at the beginning of a URL. For more information, check out Ethan Zuckerman's comments on this topic.

https://blog.torproject.org/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea
Bittorrent over Tor isn't a good idea
by arma | April 29, 2010

An increasing number of people are asking us about the recent paper hal.inria.fr/docs/00/47/15/56/PDF/TorBT.pdf coming out of Inria in France around Bittorrent and privacy attacks. This post tries to explain the attacks and what they imply.

There are three pieces to the attack (or three separate attacks that build on each other, if you prefer).

The first attack is on people who configure their Bittorrent application to proxy their tracker traffic through Tor. These people are hoping to keep their IP address secret from somebody looking over the list of peers at the tracker. The problem is that several popular Bittorrent clients (the authors call out uTorrent in particular, and I think Vuze does it too) just ignore their socks proxy setting in this case. Choosing to ignore the proxy setting is understandable, since modern tracker designs use the UDP protocol for communication, and socks proxies such as Tor only support the TCP protocol — so the developers of these applications had a choice between "make it work even when the user sets a proxy that can't be used" and "make it mysteriously fail and frustrate the user". The result is that the Bittorrent applications made a different security decision than some of their users expected, and now it's biting the users.

The attack is actually worse than that: apparently in some cases uTorrent, BitSpirit, and libTorrent simply write your IP address directly into the information they send to the tracker and/or to other peers. Tor is doing its job: Tor is _anonymously_ sending your IP address to the tracker or peer. Nobody knows where you're sending your IP address from. But that probably isn't what you wanted your Bittorrent client to send.

That was the first attack. The second attack builds on the first one to go after Bittorrent users that proxy the rest of their Bittorrent traffic over Tor also: it aims to let an attacking peer (as opposed to tracker) identify you. It turns out that the Bittorrent protocol, at least as implemented by these popular Bittorrent applications, picks a random port to listen on, and it tells that random port to the tracker as well as to each peer it interacts with. Because of the first attack above, the tracker learns both your real IP address and also the random port your client chose. So if your uTorrent client picks 50344 as its port, and then anonymously (via Tor) talks to some other peer, that other peer can go to the tracker, look for everybody who published to the tracker listing port 50344 (with high probability there's only one), and voila, the other peer learns your real IP address. As a bonus, if the Bittorrent peer communications aren't encrypted, the Tor exit relay you pick can also watch the traffic and do the attack.

That's the second attack. Combined, they present a variety of reasons why running any Bittorrent traffic over Tor isn't going to get you the privacy that you might want.

So what's the fix? There are two answers here. The first answer is "don't run Bittorrent over Tor". We've been saying for years not to run Bittorrent over Tor, because the Tor network can't handle the load; perhaps these attacks will convince more people to listen. The second answer is that if you want your Bittorrent client to actually provide privacy when using a proxy, you need to get the application and protocol developers to fix their applications and protocols. Tor can't keep you safe if your applications leak your identity.

The third attack from their paper is where things get interesting. For efficiency, Tor puts multiple application streams over each circuit. This approach improves efficiency because we don't have to waste time and overhead making a new circuit for every tiny picture on the aol.com frontpage, and it improves anonymity because every time you build a new path through the Tor network, you increase the odds that one of the paths you've built is observable by an attacker. But the downside is that exit relays can build short snapshots of user profiles based on all the streams they see coming out of a given circuit. If one of those streams identifies the user, the exit relay knows that the rest of those streams belong to that user too.

The result? If you're using Bittorrent over Tor, and you're _also_ browsing the web over Tor at the same time, then the above attacks allow an attacking exit relay to break the anonymity of some of your web traffic.

What's the fix? The same two fixes as before: don't run Bittorrent over Tor, and/or get your Bittorrent developers to fix their applications.

But as Tor developers, this attack opens up an opportunity for a third fix. Is there a way that we as Tor can reduce the damage that users can do to themselves when they use insecure applications over Tor? We can't solve the fact that you'll shoot yourself in the foot if you use Bittorrent over Tor, but maybe we can still save the rest of the leg.

One approach to addressing this problem in Tor's design is to make each user application use a separate circuit. In Linux and Unix, we can probably hack something like that up — there are ways to look up the pid (process ID) of the application connecting to our socket. I suspect it gets harder in Windows though. It also gets harder because many Tor applications use an intermediate http proxy, like Polipo or Privoxy, and we'd have to teach these other proxies how to distinguish between different applications and then pass that information along to Tor.

Another answer is to separate streams by destination port. Then all the streams that go to port 80 are on one circuit, and a stream for a different destination port goes on another circuit. We've had that idea lurking in the background for a long time now, but it's actually because of Bittorrent that we haven't implemented it: if a BT client asks us to make 50 streams to 50 different destination ports, I don't want the Tor client to try to make 50 different circuits. That puts too much load on the network. I guess we could special-case it by separating "80" and "not 80", but I'm not sure how effective that would be in practice, first since many other ports (IM, SSH, etc) would want to be special-cased, and second since firewalls are pressuring more and more of the Internet to go over port 80 these days.

We should keep brainstorming about ways to protect users even when their applications are handing over their sensitive information. But in the mean time, I think it's great that these researchers are publishing their results and letting everybody else evaluate the attacks. (If you're a researcher working on Tor attacks or defenses, check out our new research resources page.) The attacks in this paper are serious attacks if you're a Bittorrent user and you're hoping to have some privacy.

>>175466591
гугли. Проект на гитхабе есть такой.

Still, as explained, many clients publish your IP.

"The attack is actually worse than that: apparently in some cases uTorrent, BitSpirit, and libTorrent simply write your IP address directly into the information they send to the tracker and/or to other peers. Tor is doing its job: Tor is _anonymously_ sending your IP address to the tracker or peer. Nobody knows where you're sending your IP address from. But that probably isn't what you wanted your Bittorrent client to send."
https://blog.torproject.org/comment/5558#comment-5558

People who are interested in BitTorrent and Tor might want to look at the Anomos project ( http://www.anomos.info/ ).

The problem with BT over Tor is not only anonymity issues, it's _bandwidth_ issues, it has been stated by Tor peopole many, many times that BT is a major reason Tor is so slow for HTTP/S, etc. Bittorrent _should not_ be used over Tor for the sake of bandwidth! People who really need Tor, e.g., Iranian and Chinese dissidents, 1st world citizens who wish to surf without being tracked, etc, _should not_ have to suffer extremely low latency because BT users want to download copyrighted movies and music and porn! Stop being so selfish!

If you want to use BT then use I2P2, they welcome BT traffic and have clients for such traffic. Stop using Tor for BT traffic!
sesli sohbet
yuregininsesi.com/

>>175467745
Ну и хули делать тогда? Альтернативы типа нет?

>>175468006
Есть. Не выёбывайся.

>>175468063
Охуел, пёс?

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